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Chapter 7
What Do Scientists Want? Perverse Incentives 
and Replication Traumas in Cantor’s Dilemma
7.1  Summary
Prof. Isidore Cantor is a biochemist who became a cell biologist and works at a 
small university on tumorigenesis research. During a nightly visit to the toilet, he 
has a eureka-experience. His idea is that, because of some mutation affecting the 
production of arginine (an amino acid named after its bright, silvery-white colour-
ing) certain proteins are suddenly able to move freely in and out of cells (cell mem-
branes normally permit translocation only in one direction). To test the validity of 
his brain wave, he designs an innovative experiment with tagged proteins as radio-
active labels and orders his post-doc Jeremiah (Jerry) Stafford to perform it. Cantor 
insists on Jerry’s complete availability for this research, for he believes it may bring 
them the Nobel Prize, but this commanding assignment puts substantial pressures 
on the latter’s relationship with girl-friend Celestine Price, a promising biologist, 
but also a muscular campus athlete who shares an apartment with Leah, a humani-
ties scholar specialised in Bakhtin and dialogism. According to Cantor, to unravel 
the enigma of tumorigenesis would certainly be a Nobel-prize winning achieve-
ment, comparable to climbing Mount Everest or K-2 (p. 37). The analogy between 
scientific research and mountain climbing occurs several times in the novel and is a 
well-known trope (Collins 2011; Zwart 2011). Cantor sees his research field as a 
scientific Himalaya (83) and his project as a scientific Everest (p. 82), while Stafford 
is referred to as Cantor’s Sherpa (p. 37, p. 83). The Himalaya metaphor (with the 
Nobel Prize as the summit) reflects the dimension of verticality in academic research 
(Zwart 2014c).
When Stafford finishes the experiment (allegedly successfully), Cantor sends a 
manuscript to John Maddox, editor of Nature, who agrees to bypass the usual refer-
eeing process because it is such a hot topic. No experimental details are given. Their 
article appears in print within 10  days of the manuscript’s arrival, and Stafford 
learns from Cantor how scientists may tilt the choice of referees in their favour. 
Adding citations of someone’s work, for instance, is likely to lead the journal editor 
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to select that person as a referee (flattery always helps). But due to this discovery, 
Cantor (apparently an impassive researcher) suddenly becomes a craving subject, 
driven by the desire to establish priority and secure the prize (p. 61). In terms of 
university discourse: the confrontation with arginine’s role in tumorigenesis (a in 
the upper-right position), destabilises the expert (S2 in the upper-left position) and 
produces various symptoms of desire ($ in the lower-right position) in a seemingly 
impassive university professor.
For Stafford, Cantor is a lab creature (S2), but it soon turns out that he is not a 
single-minded researcher who lives solely for his work. He has a second, secret life 
(and an affluent one at that, because of a calculated marriage). Outside the lab, he 
lives the life of a gentleman-connoisseur, interested in erotic art, classical music and 
Jugendstil furniture, playing Boccherini in a string quartet and obsessed with 
Schönberg, Hindemith and Egon Schiele. In this role, he encounters Paula Curry, a 
tall, athletic, cello-playing Valkyrie who happens to be Celestine’s aunt.
Clouds begin to appear in the clear blue sky when Cantor receives a call from his 
competitor Kurt Krauss (professor at Harvard) informing him that, although he had 
put his best post-doc (Yuzo Ohashi, “my Stafford”) to work on it, the latter had been 
unable to replicate Jerry’s experiment. Cantor decides that Jerry and he should rep-
licate the experiment together, and apparently this time they are successful, until 
Cantor receives an anonymous note, an unsigned message, one sentence long, sug-
gesting that Jerry secretly doctored the results: Why was Dr. Stafford in your private 
laboratory Sunday evening? (p. 93). This of course raises Cantor’s suspicion. Why 
had Jerry secretly visited the lab? Cantor faces a dilemma. Should he retract the 
paper, exposing himself to academic humiliation, so that from now on every col-
league will associate his name with fraud, or at least with sloppiness and irreproduc-
ibility? Cantor had never withdrawn a published paper before, had never reported 
unduplicatable experiments. An error of this magnitude would never be forgotten. 
Cantor decides to perform a second experiment, using a somewhat different design, 
an alternative route to the top. With the Prize before him and the spectre of with-
drawal peering over his shoulder, he disappears into his private lab for weeks, 
unavailable to the outside world. In the end, all seems to end well. Both versions of 
the experiment are eventually confirmed, and both Cantor and Stafford fly to 
Stockholm to collect the Nobel Prize, but this does not put an end to the question-
ability of their results and the situation remains uncomfortable.
The dialectical structure of the narrative can be summarised as follows. The first 
moment (M1) is an unexpected idea which allows Cantor to link abstract biochem-
istry with something relevant and concrete, namely cancer research. But this idea 
has to be realised in an experimental fashion (M2), and this proves a frustrating 
experience, because the researchers are confronted with a hurdle, with the replica-
tion complex as it were. The goal is to overcome this hurdle, to discover the decisive 
experimental move, so that the abstract idea can be sublated into textbook knowl-
edge (M3), but on the final page of the novel it is still unclear whether this has really 
been achieved.
Djerassi, the author, is an organic chemist himself, famous for his contribution to 
the development of the oral birth control pill. Besides that, he authored several 
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“science- in-fiction” novels and plays. I will now analyse his novel from a Lacanian 
perspective, using the three dimensions distinguished earlier: knowledge, power 
and the Self.
7.2  Knowledge Production: The Epistemological Dimension
Cantor’s research project exemplifies the trend towards symbolisation in scientific 
research. It is an effort to capture an existential lifeworld threat (cancer) in bio-
chemical formulas. In cantor’s theory of tumorigenesis, the amino acid arginine 
plays a crucial role:
 
If cancer can be tamed via biochemical means, with the help of a structural for-
mula, the medical challenge can finally be addressed. Thus, the knowledge dimen-
sion adheres to the structure of university discourse:
S2 a
S1 $  
Cantor is the qualified expert (S2 in the upper-left position of the agent) who, by 
introducing biochemical expertise into cell biology, suddenly seems able to dis-
cover the decisive factor which allows him to unravel the cancer enigma, focussing 
on arginine (the object a in the upper-right position). This endeavour is driven by a 
secret, latent objective, however, which suddenly seems to come within his grasp, 
and even becomes a manifest goal at a certain point, namely to reach the summit, 
i.e. to receive the Nobel Prize. In other words, a displacement occurs, as silvery 
arginine (the initial object of desire) gives way to a golden medal (a → a): the Nobel 
Medal, together with a Nobel Diploma and a document confirming the fee, handed 
to the laureate by the Swedish King (S1). This prospect (the distinction received 
from the hands of the King, representing the dimension of verticality) is the decisive 
push, causing the researcher to become trapped in the matheme of desire ($ ◊ a).
The Nobel procedure as such represents the discourse of the Master in the novel. 
The Nobel Committee is an authoritative voice (S1 in the upper-left position), its 
verdicts are unquestionable and undebatable ($ pushed into the lower-left position), 
while allegedly impassive scientists, acting as recipients (S2), prove highly suscep-
tible to such incentives. This chronic pressure or conflict of roles, namely between 
Cantor the stoic, impassive researcher (S2 in the position of the agent in university 
discourse) and Cantor the potential Nobel laureate (S2 in the position of the  recipient 
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in the discourse of the Master) produces the brainwave: a moment of jouissance, 




But to realise this ambition, Cantor has to revert to university discourse again, 
placing himself as a qualified expert in the position of the agent (S2 in the upper-left 
position) who puts his theory to the test by performing an experiment, designed to 
tame the object a, focussed on proteins containing arginine (a in the upper-right 
position), a target which proves more intractable and recalcitrant than expected, 




Initially, however, rather than playing this role himself (rather than allowing him-
self to be exposed to these frustrations and risks), Jerry Stafford is placed in this 
position (facing and interacting with the object a), so that Cantor can keep his stoic 
distance. Stafford has to face the challenge of realising the masterful idea in a hands-
on fashion. He has to capture the recalcitrant target via experimental dexterity, but 
there is always the possibility that arginine is actually a lure, resulting in frustrations 
and despair ($ in the lower-right position).
From the very beginning, there is a clear division of labour between Master and 
Servant. Cantor acts as the Master, the gentleman-scientist who conceives the idea, 
designs the experiment and writes the article, reaping the fruits of Stafford’s labour, 
while the latter is doing the actual lab work. As soon as Stafford has finished the 
exacting experiment, Cantor quickly goes through the key data. He is jubilant (“we 
did it”, p.  56) and decides to write the paper himself. But he does not consult 
Stafford’s laboratory notebook, the actual record of his toilsome labour. He disre-
gards the tension between context of discovery (backstage, the realm of the Servant) 
and context of justification (frontstage, the realm of the Master). But an experiment 
in itself means nothing: it is only meaningful if it can be repeated (replicated) by 
someone else elsewhere. When the competing team at Harvard fails to replicate the 
trial, he requests Stafford to write up the experimental details in full, because they 
may have missed some essential technical detail, some missing step or link, but this 
does not help (p. 110). He even considers sending Xeroxes of Stafford’s lab note-
books to Kraus, but to his embarrassment he discovers that Stafford’s notebooks are 
actually rather sloppy, so that there are too many details missing. This situation is 
frustrating for Cantor (the Master), but also for Stafford (the Servant) and the sec-
ond part of the novel is basically an account of Stafford’s efforts to emancipate 
himself from the Master, but we will come to that.
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In a self-reflective mood, during a conversation with Paula Curry, Cantor con-
fesses that scientific research is not as straightforward as is sometimes suggested. 
Most scientists suffer from what he refers to as a “dissociative personality” (p. 113). 
On the one side, they are rigorous believers in the experimental method with its set 
of rules, bent on advancing knowledge (in other words: S2). On the other hand, they 
remain fallible human beings with all the accompanying emotional foibles (in other 
words: $). One of the gravest occupational hazards in science, moreover, is simulta-
neous discovery. Sooner or later, somebody else will have the same idea. Scientists 
are driven by one desire: recognition by their peers (the Krausses of this world), but 
in order to obtain recognition, priority is essential. To score a Nobel Prize, one has 
to be the first to reach the summit. Thus, the push for priority is enormous. And the 
only way to establish priority is to be the first to publish. In other words, due to the 
confrontation with arginine (the object a), the self-contained expert (S2) falls victim 
to disruptive desire, and this results in a split (Spaltung) between adherence to meth-
odological safeguards (S2) and the desire to maintain his advantage, his momentum, 
so that Cantor’s eagerness to score ($) suddenly seems to overrule his impeccable 
technique. Krauss is Cantor’s scientific conscience or superego. If the experiment 
proves impossible to replicate, Krauss may accuse him of sloppiness, or even fabri-
cation: “Surely he is not calling you a –. Paula stopped short”, p. 109). And once 
someone’s credibility in science is damaged, it can never be repaired. The only 
option left to Cantor is to do the experiment himself, to become his own Servant as 
it were, and to design a second experimental test, climbing Everest by a different 
route (p. 116). Because he cannot trust Stafford anymore (p. 113), he has to take the 
experiment literally in his own hands, doffing his costume for a lab coat. It is only 
via working through that the methodological requirements and desire for recogni-
tion can be reconciled again.
Various instances of self-reflection can be discerned on the epistemic level. In his 
Nobel speech, looking back on his experiences, Stafford suggests that the failure of 
the Harvard team to replicate the results was due to a procedural discrepancy that 
was “really quite trivial”, adding that “if there is one lesson to be learned from this 
experience, it’s that even the smallest details should be put in one’s notebook … You 
never know which details may turn out to be crucial” (p. 198). This self-reflection 
not only concurs with the principles of experimental methodology, but also with the 
psychoanalytic rule that one should report any observations; that one should take 
care not to exclude any of them, for in principle nothing is irrelevant”. Even seem-
ingly trivial details (the bagatelle) may prove to be highly significant (Freud 
1917/1940, p. 297).
But in the novel, the role of the analyst, listening to the dialogues (the flow of 
university discourse) with evenly-poised attention, and from an oblique perspective, 
falls to Leah, the expert in Bachtinian analysis (p. 82). She is not at all interested in 
proteins, membranes or arginine, but rather in the grammar of biomolecular dis-
course. When challenged to share her observations (by Jean Ardley, Leah’s supervi-
sor, who happens to visit them), she points to the remarkably role of the term “we” 
in experimental discourse. Why do scientists always use the pluralis majestatis 
(“We, scientists”, “We, the authors”) when speaking about science? What is wrong 
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with the first person singular? Who is this “we”? From a Lacanian-Bachtinian per-
spective, it is clear that the “we” functions as a grammatical operationalisation of S2: 
the replaceable, un-subjective, decidedly impersonal subject of science. But it also 
covers up the exploitation and expropriation of the servant by the Master (“We, the 
Master, did this”). And Leah’s therapeutic intervention proves effective, for from 
now on, Stafford begins to pay attention to Cantor’s use of the term “we” (or “our”), 
which suddenly may give way to “I” or “mine”. For instance, he now notices that 
Cantor informs him that the Krauss team is having troubles repeating “your” experi-
ment, and that there may be something the matter with “your” notebooks, while he 
consistently speaks about “our” Nature article. In the latter case, there is “no ambi-
guity about our” (p. 89). In other words, Cantor uses the “we” in such a way that he 
may safeguard his intellectual property rights, while attributing any experimental 
flaws to his assistant. From now on, Stafford begins to pay attention to (and even 
count) Cantor’s uses of the signifier “we” (p. 83). Indeed, the use of the signifier 
“we” proves highly symptomatic and, from the point of view of critical discourse 
analysis, a fascinating object of research.
In response to Leah’s intervention, Celestine’s supervisor makes a telling confes-
sion. At a certain point in her career, she decided to change her name from Yardley 
to Ardley, in view of the importance of alphabetic order in the listing of author 
names:
Let me confess something to you … but promise not to spread it around … When I was a 
senior at Brown [University] – and a very ambitious one, almost unpleasantly so – I paid 
very much attention to where my name would ultimately appear… To my father’s shock, I 
announced one day that I would change my name from Jean Yardly to Jean Ardley… Yes. I 
went to the courthouse and did it legally. It’s best to be first, it’s been true since prehistoric 
times (p. 51).
She suppressed (sacrificed) a letter (“emasculated” her surname as it were) to fur-
ther her career in science, in terms of academic authorship, emphasising that the 
subject of science is subjected to anonymisation anyway (so that a surname becomes 
something quite functional, something impersonal, allowing other experts to retrieve 
journal articles, or to assess citation indexes as performance indicators). This is 
exemplified by “the most anonymous of all appellations: et al.” (p. 83).
7.3  The Power Dimension: Cantor’s Sherpa
The power dimension is noticeable in various ways, for instance in terms of the 
hierarchy between top universities (such as Harvard, Berkeley or MIT, represented 
by Kurt Krauss, where Nobel Prizes come in every few years) and mediocre insti-
tutes of smaller scale (such as Cantor’s university). But it is notably evident in the 
power relationship between Master and Servant, between Cantor (the professor) and 
Stafford (his Sherpa), or even (as Paula phrases it) his “slave” (p. 80). For indeed, 
although Cantor refers to his junior researchers as “collaborators”, Celestine Price 
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and Paula Curry straightforwardly refer to them as his “slaves” (p.  80). This is 
exemplified by the following dialogue between Isidore Cantor and Paula Curry:
“Late in the Fall I thought of an experiment … and I put my best young collaborator on the 
project”.
“One of your slaves”.
“No, one of my collaborators… I basically told the man that he had to finish the work in 
three months… We published the work”
“We?”
Cantor looked puzzled. “Yes, we. Why do you ask?”
“Well, if he did the work, why did you publish it with him?”
“God, Paula, we do have a cultural gulf to bridge…Let me just assure you that in science 
it’s de rigueur. I thought of the problem and the solution, he did the actual work, and we 
published it together. That’s how it’s always done” (p. 107).
An important aspect of his position as Master is that, although from the perspective 
of his junior collaborators he seems wholly devoted to research, he actually leads a 
double life, as we have seen, a secret life as an affluent, high-brow gentleman. In his 
spare time, he engages in high culture, as an erotic art connoisseur for instance, 
being the owner of seven original erotic drawings by Egon Schiele. We learn that 
Cantor inherited a fortune from his father-in-law – a wealthy Jewish industrialist 
from Vienna, whose only daughter Cantor had married when she was thirty-six – 
and this heritage included a complete art nouveau interior, a fin-de-siècle Viennese 
decor, transplanted to Chicago, whose most remarkable item is a seating machine 
(Sitzmaschine). But this sample from Viennese existence is now embedded in the 
American way of life and combined with a splendid view over Lake Michigan.
In the course of the novel it becomes clear that Cantor’s actions are much more 
calculated, strategic and self-centred than is initially apparent. The race for priority 
(and indirectly for the Nobel Prize) is much more important to him than something 
like scientific “truth”. And Cantor is quite good at playing the publication game. At 
a certain point he deplores the abolishment of the pli cacheté, the “sealed envelope” 
system (p. 62), a reference which requires some explanatory remarks concerning 
the history of the scientific journal which, originally, was not invented as a com-
munication device, but as a device for solving priority conflicts (Zwart 2001). By 
establishing formal outlets in the form of journals, discoveries could now be attrib-
uted to the scholar who first published about it, or whose paper first reached the 
editor of an acknowledged journal. And the “sealed envelope” procedure meant that 
an article could be submitted so that a journal editor, who would date it upon receipt, 
but would refrain from opening it until the author was sufficiently certain that its 
content could be validated and replicated, or when a competitor was about to pub-
lish something similar. In that case, the original submission data of the pli cacheté 
would demonstrate priority. If still in place, it would significantly reduce the risk of 
retraction, and it would certainly have solved Cantor’s dilemma. But it would also 
turn publishing into a kind of card game, with the sealed envelope functioning as a 
kind of trump card. “I wonder what made me think of the pli cacheté system”, 
Cantor asks himself, “I hope it’s not some unconscious wish of mine” (p. 63).
From a Lacanian perspective, one could argue that the sealed envelope system 
demonstrates the extent to which the fate of the scientific subject may come to 
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depend on the “itinerary of the signifier”, already discussed in Chaps. 3 and 6 (1966, 
p. 12). The content of the sealed envelope is unknown, in principle quite significant, 
but potentially quite embarrassing, because its claims may prove false (which is 
precisely why it must remain sealed until further notice). The scientist has dis-
patched a “signifier” (i.e. a certain scientific claim, made in writing, whose content 
is no longer modifiable) which is now deposited in the hand of someone else (the 
editor), like a playing care ready to be shown, to be put on the table, as soon as the 
occasion to do so presents itself, or the instruction to do so is given. It is up to the 
author to decide whether and when the card will be shown. Others only know that a 
claim is made, but are unfamiliar with the secret content of the claim, thereby dem-
onstrating what Lacan refers to as the priority of the signifier over the signified. 
Rumours concerning the content of the submitted envelope are likely to precede its 
disclosure. Indeed, for Lacan, the content of the sealed envelope is a “signifier”, 
determining the fate of the subject sooner or later, thereby exemplifying what Lacan 
refers to as the primacy of the signifier. But others may have deposited similar 
claims of course, whose exact content is equally obscure. The signifier has primacy 
because the fate of the scientific competitors (in terms of recognition by peers) is 
already literally sealed. In this manner, the race for priority indeed becomes a kind 
of game, and Cantor’s dilemma becomes a prisoner’s dilemma. The research teams 
involved (Cantor versus Krauss) are kept “in solitary confinement” in their labs, 
unable or unwilling to share or communicate their exact findings. If you submit your 
envelope sooner, you may claim priority in case you happen to be right, but the 
chances that your results will prove inadequate or non-replicable will also be greater. 
So, yes, Lacan would argue, Cantor’s reference to the pli cacheté system most cer-
tainly reveals an unconscious desire. In fact, his unconscious already set this game 
of cards in motion (namely during the toilet scene) before he consciously became 
involved in this race for priority. If you want to lay claim to the Nobel Prize (even if 
you are still uncertain whether your claim is really true or false), there is an oppor-
tune moment to submit. In the case of Arrowsmith, the decision to postpone submis-
sion equalled academic suicide. In other words, what Cantor’s unconscious tells 
him is that the Nobel Prize (the gold medal, the “perverse incentive”) is really his 
object a, eclipsing even the silvery amino acid arginine (the official target of his 
research). The only problem is that (contrary to the prisoner’s dilemma or the pli 
cacheté system), Cantor has to lay his cards on the table straight away, in the form 
of his Nature publication. And yes, his unconscious certainly has reasons to deplore 
this. Whereas the sealed envelope would have given him and advance (meanwhile 
checking his results), the current system entails a handicap because now, retraction 
can no longer occur discretely and the card that is now on the table for all to see can 
easily be trumped by competitors like Krauss.
Cantor not only plays card games with competitors like Krauss. His most deci-
sive card game concerns his relationship with Stafford, his associate. It begins with 
the co-authorship card, which buys him Stafford’s diligence and labour, while he 
remains the corresponding author himself (firmly keeping the trump card in his 
hands as it were). But their card game takes an unexpected turn once the Nobel Prize 
is awarded to them. With some difficulty, Jerry manages to meet Cantor (now 
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 suddenly famous and besieged by the media) in private, announcing that he has a 
confession to make (p. 152). Apparently, he wants to lay his cards on the table. Jerry 
tells Cantor that “he” cannot accept the Nobel Prize (card game terms: that he has 
decided to pass), but Cantor retorts that he is not authorised to make such a decision 
by himself. The prize was awarded for what “we” published in Nature, not for 
experimental work conducted by a post-doc and proving somewhat difficult to rep-
licate. Once the card of the Nobel Prize is played, it cannot be repealed or refused. 
Even Sartre (who refused the Nobel Prize for literature for ideological reasons) is 
still on the list of Nobel laureates. In response to Stafford’s reluctance, Cantor 
decides to deal the cards (to divide the roles) as follows: while Stafford will be 
allowed to speak first, to cover the theory, Cantor will subsequently describe his 
“second” experiment, so that all scepticism concerning Stafford’s “first” experiment 
will be trumped. But Stafford is less frank or naïve than Cantor suspects, and is actu-
ally holding his cards close to his chest. There is a secret hidden in the sealed enve-
lope of his Nobel Prize speech.
Initially, everything seems in order. In the main aula of the Karolinska institute, 
Stafford announces that they will present their work in chronological order, starting 
with the “theoretical construct” (p. 197). The slides of the presentation are like play-
ing cards, and initially, Stafford puts his cards on the table as expected. But then, 
suddenly, his tone of voice seems to change: “Let us now turn to the relation of 
theory to facts… A theory cannot be proven but only disproved. In other words, it 
must be tested experimentally…Therefore, I would now like to address…” (p. 198). 
Until now, Cantor had been quite relaxed, but now his “mental radar started to detect 
the first blips of irregularity. Was it the use of the first person singular?” (p. 198; my 
italics) The “I” form (the use of the first person singular here) is symptomatic and 
indicates that Jerry suddenly plays his trump card. Actually, he has two surprises in 
store for Cantor. The first one is that he presents a detailed account of his first 
experiment. And the second is that, apparently, but unbeknownst to Cantor, this 
experiment has now finally been replicated by Dr. Ohashi (the post-doc at Krauss’s 
lab at Harvard), so that Cantor’s second experiment, as well as his Nobel speech, 
become quite irrelevant. Initially, there were problems repeating the work, Stafford 
admits, but when each step was scrutinised carefully, the discrepancy was finally 
discovered. In addition to the experiment as reported, there are always hidden 
instructions, apparently trivial details, which may become significant after all, so 
that “even the smallest detail should be put into one’s notebook” (p. 198). Meanwhile, 
Stafford continues,
…we had conceived a second test… which is now under scrutiny in Professor’s Krauss’s 
laboratory. I have no reason to doubt that it will also be replicated… So we actually have 
two independent tests in support of our theory. I trust that none of you will consider this just 
a superfluous crossing of a t, the unnecessary dotting of an i. After all, ‘tumorigenesis the-
ory’ has two t’s. And the work itself was performed by two I’s: myself, and then Professor 
Isidore Cantor. He will now tell you about that second experiment (p. 199).
And with this little trick (his trump card) emphasised by the resurgence of the “I”, 
or rather the splitting of the “we” into two I’s, Stafford quite subtly transforms the 
magnificent professor Cantor into “just another scientist” (p. 199). Via this oedipal 
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gesture, Jerry emancipates himself from his “father”, − and is now able to marry 
Celestine: happy ending of a Nobel fairy tale.
And it is only now, in the aftermath of this event, that Cantor is finally able to ask 
the question which he should have asked much earlier:
“Jerry, what did you do in my lab on that Sunday evening? The day before we completed 
the experiment together.”
Stafford looked up. “How did you know I was there?” (p. 202)
Stafford confesses that he added some additional enzyme to the incubate, and that 
he had wanted to tell Cantor, who was too preoccupied to hear him out. Cantor, 
however, is still dissatisfied. The experiment was allegedly repeated successfully at 
Harvard, but this happened – while Stafford was also there. Somehow, the success 
of the replication continues to depend on one decisive factor: Stafford’s presence. 
Facts are fabricated in the lab, facts are laboratory artefacts, but to exclude “fabrica-
tion” (in the pejorative, FFP sense) an independent test is required, and this criterion 
had still not been met, so that fraud could still not be excluded.
7.4  Experimenting and Publishing as Practices of the Self
At a certain point in the novel, Leah (the discourse analyst) scorns scientists for 
being so secretive:
Don’t you know the Latin root publicare, ‘to make generally known’? What do scientists 
want? (p. 66)
The latter sentence may be seen as referring to the famous Freudian adage “What 
does a woman want?” (“Was will das Weib?”), the one question Freud confessed he 
was never able to answer satisfactorily (Jones 1953, II, p. 421). Building on what 
was discussed above, the answer to the question “what do scientists want?” may 
seem obvious. They want to secure their claim to priority, and therefore they want 
to publish (and be the first to do so). But why, then, has scientific publishing evolved 
into such a complicated card game, involving multiple variations on the prisoner’s 
dilemma? To successfully address this question, we must take a psychoanalytic 
stance, because than we will realise that some less obvious meanings, some less 
praiseworthy associations are obfuscated by the standardised use of this term “to 
publish” in university discourse. For instance the connotation that to “make pub-
lish” etymologically means to confiscate (by the public authorities). In other words, 
as soon as you publish, your intellectual property is turned into common property, 
and scientists may therefore be reluctant to give themselves away. As long as some 
material is unpublished (safely stored in a computer, or kept in a pli cacheté) it is 
still yours. Another intriguing association, psychoanalytically speaking, is con-
nected with this one, namely the pejorative sense of the Latin term publicare. A 
publica or publicus is actually a prostitute, someone who is at everyone’s disposal. 
So, yes, there certainly are reasons for ambivalence or even reluctance when it 
comes to publishing your results or your ideas in academic journals. By making 
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something (by making yourself) public, you give up your control over your “body” 
of work. This was, as already noticed, the benefit of the “sealed envelope” system, 
which allowed the author to make a claim without giving “it” (giving himself) away. 
Yes, scientists do want their websites to be visited and their work to be downloaded 
and their thoughts to be known, but to publish also implies that you are putting your 
integrity at risk. For as soon as your work is published, there is the possibility of 
exposure, perhaps even resulting in retraction, hovering like a sword of Damocles 
over the academic author’s head, as a potential dead blow to his or her academic 
prestige. Publishing your results means that they are formally confirmed (formally 
acknowledged) by the academic symbolic order, but others may then use these pub-
lications (never flawless) to damage your reputation, especially if you try to fly too 
high (the dimension of verticality). But if you wait too long, until your material is 
flawless, you may be passed over, like a beautiful soul, as happened to Martin 
Arrowsmith. This world of meaning is looming beneath the seemingly neutral and 
unproblematic verb publicare as well as behind the question “Was will der 
Wissenschaftler? (What do scientists want? What is the desire that is spurring them 
on?)”.
The wish of the “normal” scientist is to contribute to the knowledge production 
process, by representing a reliable, self-composed form of agency (S2 in the upper- 
left position). But Cantor, in his fixation on arginine, and subsequently on winning 
the Nobel Prize, becomes exposed to “the object a”, falling victim to the matheme 
of desire ($ ◊ a). The Nobel Prize is a symbolical entity which transcends the struc-
tural formula of cellular biochemistry, causing a split ($) between fidelity to scien-
tific methodological requirements on the one hand and desire for recognition on the 
other. The Nobel Prize exemplifies the primacy of the signifier, structuring the sym-
bolical realm of science. The Nobel Prize as such (i.e. the Master signifier, S1) 
becomes and end in itself, more important than the actual content of the research 
(the signified). The Nobel represents the summit of the symbolic order, that which 
is always already there, but may suddenly come into view and within reach, a dis-
concerting, destabilising experience. As Paula Curry phrases it, just before Cantor 
is awarded the Nobel Prize: “You’re a complicated man; a man of many parts… I 
want to know what binds together your various personalities. And now, just when I 
think I’m beginning to understand you, something comes unglued” (p. 139). This 
split (Spaltung) between multiple personalities (suddenly unglued) is the by- product 
of laboratory life, of university discourse ($, the divided subject, in the lower-right 
position). It is a contemporary version of what Von Liebig (in a letter to his friend 
and colleague Wöhler) referred to as the hysteria chemicorum: the occupational 
disease of chemists, due to toxic laboratory conditions. In contemporary laborato-
ries with their clean environment, however, the toxic substance has become toxic in 
the symbolical sense of the term, as research practices become contaminated by 
perverse incentives.1
1 And he is not alone in this of course. His rival Krauss confesses to the vice of “salami publishing” 
(p. 205), i.e. slicing findings into multiple publications to increase output and impact.
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Jerry Stafford follows a different trajectory, moving in the juxtaposed direction. 
Whereas Cantor initially seems self-composed but gradually “comes unglued”, as 
Paula Curry phrases it, Jerry Stafford increasingly manages to pull himself together 
and recover his integrity. Initially there is an embarrassing tension between his 
actual practice (the sloppiness of his research, his notebooks, etc.: the context of 
discovery) and the exacting expectations of Cantor as his super-ego. The latter is not 
really interested in the actual work conducted by Stafford, he is focussed on the 
results (the surplus value, in Marxist terms), but when the Harvard lab fails to repli-
cate the experiment, he decides to photocopy and xerox Stafford’s notebook to 
Krauss. For Cantor, there is nothing improper in copying Stafford’s notebooks, 
because a scientist’s laboratory journal is not a personal diary, but rather intended 
for inspection by others on demand. But as he himself examines Stafford’s note-
books just before sending them off, he is disconcerted by what he finds in them, or 
rather: by what he does not find in them, for the actual details are surprisingly scant 
(p. 86). Too much is missing. Therefore he refrains from sharing them with Krauss 
(realising that he failed as a supervisor) and decides that they should do an experi-
ment together, so that he can monitor Stafford’s doings, and supervise him in situ 
(as an embodied conscience):
We’ll repeat your [sic!] experiment together… In my private lab… Everything will be 
under control… A minor but crucial experimental variable must be responsible…You’ll do 
every step in my presence…We’ll find what was missing in the report… Right into the lab 
and start… [Stafford] had now been ordered to repeat his spectacular experiment under the 
watchful eyes of the master (p. 92).
And indeed, the assay comes out as expected, with an arginine level which is signifi-
cantly higher than that of the control (Krauss’s group at Harvard had been unable to 
repeat the Cantor Stafford experiment, but “we [sic!] have done so now”, p. 93). But 
the scenario falters, as we have seen, when Cantor is anonymously informed (by a 
jealous colleague, or a whistle-blower) that Stafford secretly visited the lab on a 
Sunday, after hours. From now on, Stafford is de facto a distrusted suspect, a poten-
tial fraud (S2 → $), or as Cantor phrases it, to explain himself to science-illiterate but 
erudite Paula: “It’s a bit like Othello. Once the seed of suspicion is planted…” 
(p. 140). Stafford is no longer allowed into the lab, for because of this suspicion, 
everything he touches becomes symbolically contaminated. But from Jerry’s per-
spective, his sloppiness should not count as fraud (“I had just gone home when 
suddenly I realised that earlier in the day I had added too little kinase. So I returned 
to the lab, and added some more enzyme. I don’t think it was really fudging… I just 
made up for it”, p. 149).
In Stockholm, by way of compensation or reparation (Wiedergutmachung), Jerry 
announces that, instead of pursuing a promising career in science, he will step back 
and return to medical school, to earn the degree of Doctor of Medicine, in order to 
explore clinical implications of tumorigenesis research (the Arrowsmith scenario as 
it were). In other words, also in an ethical sense, he seems bent on overtaking 
Cantor, for the latter never considered practical implications at all, being solely 
obsessed with winning the Nobel Prize, for which he saw tumorigenesis research as 
purely instrumental.
7 What Do Scientists Want? Perverse Incentives and Replication Traumas in Cantor’s…
163
To summarize: eventually the novel becomes a podium for the unfolding of the 
discourse of the analyst:
a $
S2 S1  
This type of discourse starts off with the question raised by Leah, who indeed 
plays the role of psychoanalyst in the novel,2 namely: Que voi? What do scientists 
want (p. 66)? Initially, their cupido sciendi is bent on symbolisation: replacing the 
physical, phenomenal suffering of cancer patients by the noumenal, structural for-
mula, for instance concerning “silvery” arginine (C6H14N4O2). For Cantor, however, 
the ultimate trophy is something even more symbolical, namely the gold medal, the 
Nobel Prize (that which pulls him into action: a as agent, upper-left position). This 
alluring entity provokes him and transforms him (the allegedly self-composed pro-
fessor) into a craving subject, suffering from hysteria chemicorum, but in a contem-
porary form: the tendency of researchers to forget or disavow their vocation, the 
constraints of their profession (S2 now in the lower-left position), so as to give in to 
“perverse incentives” (coming from a). His counterpart Stafford, perhaps disillu-
sioned by the realities of laboratory life, moves in the opposite direction: from the 
noumenal, symbolical world of chemical formula and academic credits back into 
the “real” world of biomedical (evidence-based) health care. The by-product of the 
narrative is a normative lesson (S1 in the lower-left position). As the author argues 
in his Afterword, although the science in the novel is fictitious, the ethics (the ques-
tionable research practices, such as data trimming, data smoothing, etc.) is not 
(p. 229). And the primary goal of the discourse of the analyst is normative insight 
(finding out the truth concerning your desire).
2 “A small dose of psychoanalysis wouldn’t hurt you before you make up your mind”, advised Leah 
(p. 119).
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